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Prior to the early 20th century, a lot of empirical research in psychology concerned itself with 
descriptions of consciousness, and it was commonly assumed that one could arrive at such descriptions 
by relying on subjects’ reports about the experiences they had when exposed to particular stimuli. In 
this vein, the tradition of psychophysics in the psychology of perception aimed to formulate laws that 
would capture the relationship between physical stimuli and the ways in which they were experienced 
(e.g., Fechner 1860). This raised important methodological concerns, however: On the one hand, one 
needed independent measures of both stimuli and experience in order to formulate the functional 
relationship between them. On the other hand, experiences of stimuli could only be accessed by 
presenting subjects with stimuli, raising the question of whether the description of the experience was 
potentially contaminated by that of the stimulus. It is this worry that Edward Titchener (1905) addressed 
when coining the expression “stimulus error.” By this expression he meant both (a) the error (on the 
part of experimental subjects) to mistake descriptions of experienced objects for descriptions of the 
experience itself and (b) the error (on the part of the experimenter) to treat their experimental subjects 
as reliable reporters of their own experiences, hence introducing a particular kind of measurement error 
into psychophysical experiments (see Chirimuuta’s contribution to this panel). His proposed solution to 
this problem was to provide subjects with instructions that would minimize the stimulus error by 
maximizing the veridicality of their introspective reports (Titchener 1905; Schwitzgebel 2011, ch.5. For 
the notion of instruction see Hatfield’s contribution to this panel). 
 
In my talk I will argue that while the notion of a stimulus error continues to pose intriguing philosophical 
puzzles, Titchener’s attempt to address it by means of a training manual for experimental introspection 
has produced something of a historical and philosophical red herring insofar as it has created the 
impression that the problem of the stimulus error is related to introspection per se. On the historical 
side, this assumption has obscured the recognition that (contrary to behaviorist rhetoric) the main point 
of contention with regard to Titchener’s approach was not his introspectionism, but his structuralist 
conception of psychology (see also Hatfield 2005; Beenfeldt 2013). On the philosophical side, it has 
obscured the significance of this issue to at least two topics in current philosophy of science, concerning 
the role errors play in investigative contexts (see Hon et al. 2009; Alchins 2001; Mayo 1996) and the 
relevance of the stimulus error to areas of psychological research other than perception or 
consciousness. 
 
 While Titchener may have coined the term “stimulus error,” the worry that we read features of stimuli 
into the experience was articulated by others as well. Two versions of this worry were the following: 
First, in response to Fechner’s psychophysical program, many pointed out that the measurability of the 
intensity of a stimulus does not imply the measurability of the intensity of an experience (Boring, 1921). 
Second, Gestalt psychologists argued vehemently that one should not assume a one-to-one 
correspondence between elements of stimuli and elements of experiences (Gestalt theorists referred to 
this assumption as the “mosaic hypothesis”). I argue that both of these points express a concern about 
committing a stimulus error. However, the Gestalt psychological articulation did not call for more 
accurate introspection and clearly pulled into an entirely different direction from Titchener’s 
articulation, to the point that Titchener and the Gestalt psychologists would effectively accuse each 
other of committing a stimulus error. This shows, I will argue, that the disagreement lay much deeper 
and could not be fixed by providing adequate training for experimental subjects. The real issue was what 
were appropriate types of stimuli, isolated elements or holistic configurations? This was a theoretical 
disagreement, which determined the actors’ views about experimental methods. 
 
I will argue that my historical analysis affords us insights into (a) the very notion of a measurement 
error, and (b) the problematic of making inferences from features of experimental tasks to features of 
the mind. In elaborating on the first point, I will draw on existing literature about the role of errors in 
experimental science. Deborah Mayo (1996), for example, has argued that scientific knowledge 
generation consists not only in theory-testing, but also in probing for errors, which can be deeply 
engrained in some of the very conceptual and material assumptions required in order to run an 
experiment (see Alchins 2001). My historical case study gives some indication of how difficult this can 
be. In elaborating on the second point, I will argue that there is a structural similarity between the 
worries about stimulus error we find in the 19th and early 20th century and more recent considerations 
(both in psychology and philosophy of psychology) of the question that while it is important to analyze 
the tasks required of experimental subjects, this does not imply that there is a mental module that is 
specifically designed for this kind of task (e.g., Bechtel 2008). I will argue that this is a modern-day 
version of the concern about stimulus errors. 
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